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David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz
Summary
For-profit, or proprietary, colleges are the fastest-growing postsecondary schools in the nation, 
enrolling a disproportionately high share of disadvantaged and minority students and those 
ill-prepared for college. Because these schools, many of them big national chains, derive most 
of their revenue from taxpayer-funded student financial aid, they are of interest to policy mak-
ers not only for the role they play in the higher education spectrum but also for the value they 
provide their students. In this article, David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz look 
at the students who attend for-profits, the reasons they choose these schools, and student out-
comes on a number of broad measures and draw several conclusions.
First, the authors write, the evidence shows that public community colleges may provide an 
equal or better education at lower cost than for-profits. But budget pressures mean that com-
munity colleges and other nonselective public institutions may not be able to meet the demand 
for higher education. Some students unable to get into desired courses and programs at public 
institutions may face only two alternatives: attendance at a for-profit or no postsecondary educa-
tion at all. 
Second, for-profits appear to be at their best with well-defined programs of short duration that 
prepare students for a specific occupation. But for-profit completion rates, default rates, and 
labor market outcomes for students seeking associate’s or higher degrees compare unfavorably 
with those of public postsecondary institutions. In principle, taxpayer investment in student 
aid should be accompanied by scrutiny concerning whether students complete their course of 
study and subsequently earn enough to justify the investment and pay back their student loans. 
Designing appropriate regulations to help students navigate the market for higher education has 
proven to be a challenge because of the great variation in student goals and types of programs. 
Ensuring that potential students have complete and objective information about the costs and 
expected benefits of for-profit programs could improve postsecondary education opportunities 
for disadvantaged students and counter aggressive and potentially misleading recruitment prac-
tices at for-profit colleges, the authors write. 
www.futureofchildren.org
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D
uring the past fifteen years, 
youth from minority and 
disadvantaged backgrounds 
and those ill-prepared for 
college increasingly and 
disproportionately have enrolled in programs 
at for-profit colleges. These programs promise 
much, are often open to those who do not 
meet traditional college-entry requirements, 
and are largely funded by federal student 
financial aid, particularly federal grants 
and loans. We analyze the rapid growth of 
for-profits, look more closely at the students 
who enroll in them, and assess their role in 
providing the skills of tomorrow to the youth 
of today.
What Are For-Profit Colleges?
For-profit sector institutions are a var-
ied group. The sector contains the largest 
schools by enrollment in the United States 
and also some of the smallest. For example, 
the University of Phoenix Online program 
enrolled more than 532,000 students dur-
ing the 2009 academic year, and the largest 
fifteen institutions, taken together, account 
for almost 60 percent of for-profit enroll-
ments.1 Yet, in the fall of 2009, the median 
enrollment in all for-profit institutions eligible 
to accept federal student aid under Title IV 
of the Higher Education Act was just 172 
students.2 For-profit schools, also known as 
proprietary institutions, offer a wide array 
of programs, from doctorates to certificates 
earned in a year or less, in fields ranging 
from health care and business to information 
technology and graphic design to cosmetol-
ogy and cooking. 
The for-profit sector has existed for more than 
a century in the form of “career colleges,” pro-
prietary institutions that mostly have offered 
short courses in applied fields and served local 
labor markets. Yet, today, for-profit higher 
education has become, in many people’s 
minds, synonymous with large brand-name 
institutions that have rapidly expanded their 
presence in the bachelor’s degree and gradu-
ate education markets. For-profit chains led 
by online institutions have experienced phe-
nomenal growth in the past several decades.3 
Enrollment in the for-profit sector has more 
than tripled since 2000, and large national 
chains are responsible for nearly 90 percent 
of this increase.4 Thus the current incarna-
tion of the for-profit sector is big business; the 
sector’s largest providers are highly profitable, 
publicly traded corporations.5
In the past decade, the federal government 
has greatly expanded the funding of stu-
dent aid under Title IV to increase access to 
postsecondary education. From 2000–01 to 
2010–11, real federal expenditures on the  
Pell Grant program more than tripled from 
$10 billion to $35 billion (in 2010 dollars) 
and real Stafford Loan volumes more than 
doubled from $37 billion to $86 billion.6 In 
contrast, from 2000 to 2010, state tax appro-
priations for higher education increased 
by only about 5 percent in real terms, with 
zero real growth since 2007.7 Thus, the large 
recent increase in federal higher education 
spending has coincided with a tightening of 
state budgets.
In the face of sluggish growth in state fund-
ing for public institutions, for-profit colleges 
have grown rapidly to meet demand and have 
taken advantage of expanded federal student 
aid. Proprietary institutions increased their 
share of the total fall enrollment in Title  
IV–eligible institutions from about 4 percent 
in 2000 to nearly 11 percent in 2009.8 For-
profit colleges were responsible for nearly  
30 percent of the total growth in postsecond-
ary enrollment and degrees awarded in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century.9VOL. 23 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2013   139
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Finely attuned to the marketplace, the 
for-profits are quick to open new schools, hire 
faculty, and add programs that train students 
for jobs in fast-growing areas such as health 
care and information technology. They pro-
vide identical curriculum and teaching prac-
tices at multiple locations and at convenient 
times, and they offer highly structured pro-
grams that make timely completion feasible.10 
In principle, such responsiveness to employer 
and student demand leads to greater innova-
tion and efficiency in the marketplace for 
higher education. Yet the vast bulk of revenue 
among large for-profit chains derives from 
federal student aid, potentially reducing cus-
tomer (student) sensitivity to price and quality. 
Many of the chains have developed business 
strategies that involve heavy investments to 
expand enrollment. Indeed, audit studies have 
shown that some for-profits have engaged in 
highly aggressive recruiting techniques, some 
of which border on fraudulence.11 
The snippets of available evidence suggest 
that the economic returns to students who 
attend for-profit colleges are lower than those 
for public and nonprofit colleges. Moreover, 
default rates on student loans for proprietary 
schools far exceed those of other higher-
education institutions. Although for-profit 
colleges have had strong financial incentives 
to innovate in ways that increase enroll-
ments, the rapid growth of the sector may 
have eroded program quality. A challenge for 
federal regulation of the for-profit sector is to 
design incentives for improved quality, while 
still preserving access for students from dis-
advantaged and nontraditional backgrounds. 
Who Are the Students?
Students in for-profit colleges are dispropor-
tionately older (65 percent are twenty-five 
or older), African American (22 percent), 
and female (65 percent). For-profit colleges 
also enroll a more disadvantaged group of 
beginning undergraduates than do other 
postsecondary schools.12 Student character-
istics can be gleaned from the Beginning 
Postsecondary Students (BPS) longitudinal 
survey for 2004–09. This survey follows a 
nationally representative sample of first-time, 
full-year undergraduates who began their 
postsecondary schooling in the 2003–04 aca-
demic year. For-profit colleges, particularly 
those that specialize in online education, also 
enroll many part-time and returning stu-
dents. These two groups are not represented 
in the BPS data, however, and the compari-
sons below do not apply to them.13
Only 75 percent of first-time undergraduates 
enrolled in for-profit colleges have a high 
school diploma, compared with 85 percent  
of students in community colleges and  
95 percent in public or nonprofit four-year 
colleges (most of the other undergraduates 
have a General Educational Development 
diploma, or GED). Dependent students  
in for-profit colleges have about half as  
much family income as students in com-
munity colleges and nonselective four-year 
public or private nonprofit colleges. Finally, 
students in for-profits are two and half times 
more likely than community college students 
to be single parents (29 percent versus  
12 percent).14Despite the low-income status 
of most of their clientele, for-profit colleges 
are far more expensive than their counter-
parts in the public and nonprofit sectors. 
The first two sets of bar graphs in figure 1 
show differences in net tuition (tuition minus 
grants) by type of institution and in the 
average Pell Grant award for BPS students 
in 2003, their first year of enrollment. (The 
figure excludes selective four-year institutions 
to which most students at for-profits would 
not be admitted.) Net tuition at proprietary 
schools averaged a bit more than $5,500 in 140    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN   
David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz
2003, compared with just under $3,500 at 
nonselective four-year public and nonprofit 
colleges, and less than $750 at community 
colleges.15 The average Pell Grant award for 
students at for-profits (including those not 
receiving grants) was $2,149, more than three 
times the average award for students in com-
munity colleges and twice as large as that for 
students in nonselective four-year schools.
Students leave for-profit colleges with higher 
levels of debt than students from the other 
types of institutions and are more likely to 
default on their student loans (see the last two 
bar graphs in figure 1). Six years after initial 
enrollment, students at nonselective four-year 
colleges have federal student loan balances 
similar to those of students at for-profits 
($8,153 and $7,460, respectively). But many 
for-profit students enroll in just one- or two-
year programs. Therefore, the debt burden 
per year of postsecondary education is higher 
at the for-profit institutions. Nearly 20 per-
cent of first-time undergraduates at for-profits 
default on a federal loan within six years of 
enrollment, compared with 7 percent and  
6 percent for borrowers at nonselective four-
year and community colleges, respectively.16 
Mean differences in degree and certificate 
attainment, employment, earnings, and 
satisfaction by institution type are shown in 
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Figure 1. Student Finances by Type of Postsecondary Institutions, for First-Time Students in 2003   
For-profit (N=1,950) Community college (N=5,930) Nonselective four-year (N=1,920)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 04/09 Longitudinal 
Survey. 
Note: Figures are weighted to be nationally representative of first-time, full-year undergraduates in fall 2003. Net tuition is calculated as tuition 
minus total grants (including Pell Grants). The 2009 cumulative loan balance and default measures include only loans from federal Title IV 
sources. Net tuition, Pell Grants, and cumulative loan balance are in “current” dollars. See table 1 for definition of nonselective four-year 
institutions.  
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Figure 1. Student Finances by Type of Postsecondary Institution, for First-Time Students in 2003  
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 04/09 
Longitudinal Survey.  
 
Note: Figures are weighted to be nationally representative of first-time, full-year undergraduates in fall 2003. Net tuition is calcu-
lated as tuition minus total grants (including Pell Grants). The 2009 cumulative loan balance and default measures include only 
loans from federal Title IV sources. Net tuition, Pell Grants, and cumulative loan balance are in “current” dollars. See table 1 for 
definition of nonselective four-year institutions.  VOL. 23 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2013   141
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figure 2. About 54 percent of students who 
initially seek to enroll in certificate programs 
at for-profit colleges complete their course 
of study within six years, compared with just 
42 percent at community colleges.17 Seekers 
of an associate’s degree are more likely to 
complete their degree if they enroll in a 
for-profit college than in a community col-
lege. But because some community college 
students who originally enrolled in an associ-
ate’s program go on to complete a bachelor’s 
degree, there is no overall difference in any 
degree completion among associate’s degree 
seekers at the two types of institutions. Only 
26 percent of bachelor’s degree seekers in 
for-profit colleges complete within six years, 
compared with 53 percent at nonselective 
four-year public and nonprofit institutions. 
Students who attended for-profit colleges are 
more likely to be unemployed and have lower 
earnings once they leave school than those in 
community colleges and other nonselective 
institutions. Six years after initial enrollment, 
23 percent of students who had graduated 
or otherwise left for-profit colleges were 
unemployed and seeking work compared with 
about 15 percent in the other institutions. 
Among the employed, for-profit students had 
modestly lower earnings than those from 
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Figure 2. Student Outcomes by Type of Institution
For-profit (N=1,950) Community college (N=5,930) Nonselective four-year (N=1,920)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 04/09 
Longitudinal Survey. 
Note: Figures are weighted to be nationally representative of first-time, full-year undergraduates in fall 2003. Certificate completion covers only 
students starting in certificate programs; associate’s or more completion covers those starting in associate’s programs; and bachelor’s covers 
those starting in bachelor’s programs. The unemployed and earnings measures exclude students who report that they are still enrolled in school 
in Spring 2009. To be able to include all variables on the same chart, earnings are scaled by 100,000; for example, $20,000 is 0.2. See table 1 
for definition of nonselective four-year institutions. 
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Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 04/09 
Longitudinal Survey.  
 
Note: Figures are weighted to be nationally representative of first-time, full-year undergraduates in fall 2003. Certificate comple-
tion covers only students starting in certificate programs; associate’s or more completion covers those starting in associate’s 
programs; and bachelor’s covers those starting in bachelor’s programs. The unemployed and earnings measures exclude students 
who report that they are still enrolled in school in spring 2009. To be able to include all variables on the same chart, earnings are 
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other sectors—$28,000 compared with about 
$31,000 for students from the comparison 
institutions. Students in the for-profit sector 
were less satisfied with their programs. Only 
65 percent felt their “education was worth 
the cost” compared with about 80 percent in 
nonselective publics and nonprofits.
Although the comparisons are made across 
students in programs of different length, 
the main conclusions hold within certificate, 
associate’s degree, and bachelor’s degree 
programs, and the results are similar when 
alternative measures of employment and 
satisfaction are used.18
Economic Returns to Attending a 
For-Profit Institution
Do higher default and unemployment 
rates mean that for-profit colleges are fail-
ing students? Not necessarily. Students in 
for-profits tend to be in more precarious 
financial situations than other students 
before they enroll. Many of those from 
for-profits who defaulted on their loans or 
were unable to find work might have been 
in the same predicament even if they had 
attended a public or nonprofit institution. 
For-profit college leaders and their advocates 
argue that a fair comparison of loan default 
rates and other outcomes across types of 
institutions must account for differences in 
the characteristics of incoming students.19
In earlier work, we compared student out-
comes across institutions after adjusting for 
type of degree or certificate program, degree 
expectations, and a wide range of student 
background characteristics, using both ordi-
nary least squares regression and matching 
models.20 Four main findings emerged. First, 
the cumulative federal student loan balances 
and the student loan default rates remained 
substantially higher for students attending 
for-profits than for “comparable” students 
attending public and private nonprofit 
institutions. 
Second, we found that for-profit colleges do a 
good job of graduating students from certifi-
cate and associate’s programs but a poor job 
of graduating them from bachelor’s programs 
within six years. Third, adjusting for stu-
dent background characteristics and income 
before enrollment narrowed the gap in post-
school employment and earnings outcomes 
by about 50 percent but did not eliminate it. 
Students in for-profit colleges still had lower 
earnings and were less likely to be employed 
six years after their initial enrollment, overall 
as well as within the certificate and degree 
groups. Fourth, statistical adjustment did 
not noticeably narrow the satisfaction gap for 
students in for-profit colleges; these students 
were still far less likely to be satisfied with 
their education or to believe that it was worth 
the financial investment.
Overall, little solid evidence exists on the 
economic returns to a for-profit education. 
Do higher default and 
unemployment rates mean 
that for-profit colleges 
are failing students? Not 
necessarily. Students in 
for-profits tend to be in 
more precarious financial 
situations than other students 
before they enroll.VOL. 23 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2013   143
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Existing research on this question combines 
two related approaches: analyses of the 
change in earnings for individual students 
measured before and after attending a for-
profit institution, and comparisons of the 
earnings outcomes for students attending  
for-profits to those attending other postsec-
ondary institutions.
Using the same 2004–09 BPS data source 
as we do here, Kevin Lang and Russell 
Weinstein found that, six years after program 
entry, those who had completed a certificate 
at a for-profit institution had no increase in 
earnings compared with students who began 
the course but did not complete it.21 Lang and 
Weinstein also found that those who com-
pleted an associate’s program at a for-profit 
school had only modest (and not statistically 
significant) earnings increases relative to 
those who did not complete it. In contrast, 
they find large positive and statistically 
significant earnings increases for students 
completing an associate’s degree in a public or 
nonprofit institution.
Using administrative panel data on earnings 
and enrollment from the Internal Revenue 
Service for a sample of 45 million individuals 
who enrolled as undergraduates from 1999 to 
2008, Nicholas Turner found smaller returns 
for students in for-profit colleges compared 
with other types of institutions in a frame-
work that compared earnings before and after 
attendance.22 In contrast, Stephanie Cellini 
and Latika Chaudhary compared the earnings 
trajectories of students from private and pub-
lic two-year institutions using panel data from 
the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth and found that students completing an 
associate’s degree at two-year private (mainly 
for-profit) colleges had about the same earn-
ings increases as similar students at two-year 
public institutions.23
We draw several conclusions from the 
nascent literature on economic returns to 
a for-profit education. Students attending 
for-profits wind up earning less than stu-
dents from other types of institutions, and 
the change in their earnings after attending 
a for-profit appears to be less than or similar 
to the change in earnings from attending a 
nonprofit or public institution. The combina-
tion of equal or lower benefits and a higher 
cost of attendance suggests that for-profit 
institutions are not offering students as good 
a return on their investment as do other 
types of colleges. But because none of these 
studies has a strong experimental or quasi-
experimental design, they should be used 
with caution. More research and more data 
are needed. 
Because of data limitations, the existing litera-
ture has focused on overall mean comparisons 
of outcomes for students by college institu-
tional control rather than by specific program. 
It is likely that some certificates and degrees 
awarded by for-profits are a good investment, 
whereas others are not. Future research 
should examine the extensive heterogeneity in 
programs in the for-profit sector. 
Why Do Students Enroll in a 
 For-Profit  Institution?
Taking the evidence above at face value, we 
ask: If for-profit education is not a good invest-
ment relative to that from other types of insti-
tutions, why has for-profit enrollment grown 
so fast? Several explanations are possible.
Keeping Up with Employer Demand
For-profit colleges often specialize in short 
programs that are narrowly focused toward 
preparation for particular occupations. 
Because of that, they are often called career 
colleges. In the for-profit sector, an associ-
ate’s degree typically serves as the terminal 144    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN   
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credential for a particular occupation, 
whereas in the public and nonprofit sectors 
it is often a gateway to a four-year degree. 
Thirty-eight percent of associate’s degrees 
granted by public and nonprofit institutions, 
but just 2 percent granted by for-profits, are 
in general studies and liberal arts. For-profits 
specialize in particular associate’s degree pro-
grams. They produce 18 percent of all associ-
ate’s degrees but account for 33 percent of 
those granted in business, management, and 
marketing; 51 percent in computer science; 
and 23 percent in the health professions.24
Many students in for-profit colleges enroll in 
short programs with a clearly defined cur-
riculum (often geared toward training stu-
dents to pass an occupational licensing exam) 
and specific job placement goals. To succeed, 
such programs must have close connections 
with industry, provide active help with job 
placement, and be able to adjust instruction 
rapidly to the changing needs of employers. 
Institutions must also be able to alter staff-
ing and other resources to accommodate 
increases in demand for popular programs. 
For-profit colleges may do a better job than 
other institutions in expanding capacity in 
highly demanded occupations where jobs are 
plentiful. Furthermore, Sarah Turner found 
that for-profits are more responsive than pub-
lic institutions in adjusting their enrollment 
capacities to indicators of aggregate student 
demand such as changes in the college-age 
population in a state.25
Do students choose for-profit colleges 
because they offer programs that are more 
closely attuned to the current needs of 
employers? Do for-profits perform relatively 
better within these groups of programs? We 
address these questions by focusing on the 
health professions. 
For-profits have moved nimbly into the health 
professions where job opportunities have 
been expanding. Ten of the twenty fastest-
growing occupations in the United States are 
related to health care. Much of this growth 
has come in allied health care support occu-
pations such as medical assistants, phleboto-
mists, and X-ray and ultrasound technicians, 
for which an associate’s degree or a certificate 
is usually sufficient for employment.26 Not 
surprisingly, given rapidly growing employer 
demand, overall postsecondary enrollment in 
health-related programs has doubled during 
the past decade. Growth has been relatively 
faster among for-profits—just over half of all 
students enrolled in such programs in 2009 
were attending for-profits, compared with  
35 percent in 2000. In the 2008–09 aca-
demic year, programs in the health profes-
sions made up the single largest field of study 
in for-profit colleges and the second-largest in 
community colleges.
How do these students fare in the labor mar-
ket? Figure 3 compares outcomes for students 
enrolled in allied health programs in commu-
nity colleges and for-profits. The pattern of 
results is qualitatively similar to those already 
seen for differences by type of institution 
across all programs. Student loan default rates 
are slightly lower in the health professions 
than overall, but the students in health fields 
at for-profits have a similarly higher default 
rate than those from community colleges as 
they do overall. The for-profit advantage is 
only about 2 percentage points for certifi-
cate completion in health programs and is 
reversed for associate’s degree completion in 
these areas. In fact, students in a community 
college health program are more than twice 
as likely to complete their associate’s degree 
than are students in health programs at a for-
profit institution (35 versus 17 percent). VOL. 23 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2013   145
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Unemployment rates within each institution 
type are about 5 percentage points lower for 
the health professions than for all programs 
combined (compare figures 2 and 3). Still, 
students from for-profit health programs are 
more than twice as likely as students from 
community college programs to be unem-
ployed (19 versus 9 percent), and those that 
are employed have about 12 percent lower 
earnings. Satisfaction rates for health pro-
grams are considerably higher than average, 
but the gap between community colleges 
and for-profits is still about 14 percentage 
points. In results not shown, we confirm that 
statistical adjustment for student character-
istics does little to change the magnitude of 
these differences.
In sum, we find that students enrolled in 
health-related programs at for-profit col-
leges have worse outcomes than community 
college students in similar programs. Based 
on these results, we conclude that the focus 
of for-profits on fast-growing occupations is 
unlikely to fully explain why a student would 
choose to enroll in a for-profit college if the 
student also had access to a comparable com-
munity college program. 
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Figure 3. Outcomes of Students in Allied Health Programs
For-profit (N=170) Community college (N=600)
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) 04/09 Longitudinal 
Survey. 
Note: Figures are weighted to be nationally representative of first-time, full-year undergraduates in Fall 2003. The sample consists of students 
who were enrolled in certificate or associate’s degree programs that were categorized as “Health Professions and Related Clinical Sciences” by 
the U.S. Department of Education’s 2000 Classification of Instructional Programs Codes. The “Unemployed” and “Earnings” measures exclude 
students who report that they are still enrolled in school in Spring 2009. To be able to include all variables on the same chart, earnings are scaled 
by 100,000; for example, $20,000 is 0.2. See table 1 for definition of nonselective four-year institutions.
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Better Guidance and Student Services
Another explanation for the popularity 
of the for-profits is that even though they 
offer programs similar to those at com-
munity colleges, the for-profits provide a 
more structured, supervised approach. In a 
comparative study of colleges in a major city, 
James Rosenbaum, Regina Deil-Amen and 
Ann Person found that students at what they 
call “private occupational colleges” (mean-
ing for-profit, proprietary, or career colleges) 
had higher completion rates than students 
at community colleges.27 The researchers 
demonstrated that, compared with commu-
nity colleges, private occupational colleges 
undertook a more active role in guiding  
students through the process of enrollment 
and completion and that they more aggres-
sively assisted with job search. But that 
conclusion seems at odds with the finding 
that students at for-profit colleges have worse 
employment outcomes and are less satisfied 
with their programs. 
One possible explanation, which the 
researchers themselves advanced explicitly, 
is that their study of a group of particularly 
strong private occupational colleges does not 
generalize to the for-profit sector overall.28 In 
addition, their study took place between 2000 
and 2002 at the beginning of the rapid rise in 
for-profit college enrollment, and they did not 
study the chain institutions in which most of 
the recent enrollment growth has been con-
centrated. Thus, the lessons they drew from 
comparing for-profits to community colleges 
may not hold today or for the for-profit sector 
as a whole.
A related possibility is that for-profit col-
leges do a better job of accommodating the 
busy schedules of older students by offering 
courses at flexible times such as nights and 
weekends. However, community colleges 
also offer courses at all hours. In 2009, the 
New York Times reported that some com-
munity colleges were holding classes nearly 
twenty-four hours a day to respond to enroll-
ment spikes brought about by the economic 
recession. Bunker Hill Community College in 
Massachusetts offered classes from midnight 
to 2:30 a.m., as did Clackamas Community 
College in Oregon. Many other schools 
started their classes as early as 6 a.m.29 
Although much of the growth in for-profit 
college enrollment has come from online 
education, community colleges also offer 
many classes online. In fact, among first- 
time undergraduates in 2003, more than  
13 percent of students at community colleges 
reported taking at least one class online, 
compared with only about 6 percent of 
Although much of the 
growth in for-profit college 
enrollment has come from 
online education, community 
colleges also offer many 
classes online. In fact, among 
first-time undergraduates in 
2003, more than 13 percent 
of students at community 
colleges reported taking 
at least one class online, 
compared with only about 
6 percent of students at for-
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students at for-profit colleges. By fall 2011, 
46 percent of community college students 
reported taking at least one class online.30 
Overcrowding at Community Colleges
Students might turn to for-profit colleges 
because local community colleges are over-
crowded or otherwise unable to meet their 
needs. The past decade has seen stagnant 
or declining state funding of community 
colleges coupled with a growing demand 
for postsecondary education. With their 
open-access mission, community colleges 
face enormous pressure to accommodate 
more students despite having fewer dollars 
to do so. Not surprisingly, overcrowding of 
popular courses and programs has resulted. 
According to a nationally representative sur-
vey of U.S. community college students,  
37 percent reported that they had been 
unable to enroll in at least one course during 
the fall 2011 semester because it was full, and 
20 percent reported that they would have 
trouble enrolling in courses required for their 
degree or certificate.31 
Even if students are able to enroll in a com-
munity college, they may have to take some 
remedial courses before they are able to start 
working toward a degree. Compared with 
for-profits, community colleges are more 
likely to require students to take remedial 
courses, which do not count toward a degree. 
Less than 8 percent of first-time undergradu-
ates in for-profit colleges enrolled in remedial 
coursework in 2003–04, compared with 
nearly 30 percent in community colleges. 
Lower rates of remediation at the for-profit 
institutions could reflect lower academic 
standards. On the other hand, the system 
adopted by many community colleges of 
assigning students to remedial coursework 
based on performance on a standardized 
placement exam might be an inefficient use 
of resources. Students might turn to for-profit 
colleges for short programs, seeking to avoid 
extensive remediation at community colleges 
that could double the time it takes for them 
to earn a degree.32 
Higher education funding in California 
provides an instructive case study of how 
for-profit colleges might step into the vacuum 
created by shrinking public budgets. In 
response to an anticipated cut of $825 million 
in 2009, the community colleges of California 
capped enrollment growth, cut hundreds 
of courses, and imposed a hiring freeze on 
lecturers and support staff.33 In fall 2009, the 
California Community Colleges Chancellor’s 
Office announced a partnership with Kaplan 
University, a large and predominately 
online for-profit university owned by the 
Washington Post Company, which is publicly 
traded. The agreement allowed students at 
certain community colleges to take online 
courses from Kaplan and receive credit that 
would transfer back to their institution. 
Even though Kaplan gave California students 
a 42 percent discount, a three-credit course 
was still about eight times as expensive as 
one at a California community college ($645 
versus $78).34 The agreement lasted less than 
a year, mainly because community colleges 
were unable to guarantee that public four-
year colleges in California would accept 
transfer credits from Kaplan. Still, Kaplan 
made inroads with community college stu-
dents. Shortly after announcing the agree-
ment, the for-profit created a new scholarship 
program “designed to help students affected 
by the fiscal crisis plaguing California’s state 
college system.”35 
The best evidence on the impact of state 
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choices comes from Stephanie Cellini, who 
found that for-profit colleges in California 
were more likely to enter local markets after 
community college bond referendums failed 
to pass.36 With a strong research design based 
on a comparison of communities where bond 
initiatives barely failed to those where they 
barely passed, this study provides strong 
causal evidence of the connection between 
constraints on public sector funding and the 
growth of for-profit institutions. 
Marketing and Recruitment Activities of 
For-Profit Colleges 
A further possibility is that, in the face of 
limited information on the costs and benefits 
of different programs, student enrollment 
decisions may be greatly influenced by the 
advertising and recruiting efforts of for-
profit colleges. All postsecondary institutions 
eligible for federal student grants and loans, 
including for-profits, are responsible for put-
ting together a student’s financial aid package 
from a mix of federal and state aid, institu-
tional grants, and federal and private loans. 
Once schools assemble this information, it is 
presented to the student, who then decides 
whether to enroll (see the article on financial 
aid in this issue by Susan Dynarski and Judith 
Scott-Clayton). Institutional control of the 
assembly of financial aid packages has advan-
tages given the complexity of the financial aid 
system. Yet it also creates potential conflicts of 
interest for the institution and incentives for 
aggressive and deceptive recruiting practices, 
especially if employee compensation is based 
on success in attracting students and getting 
the federal student aid that comes with them.
As early as 1991, the federal government 
attempted to regulate the use of incentive 
compensation for employees of for-profit col-
leges. The Higher Education Amendments of 
1992 banned for-profit colleges from paying 
commissions, bonuses, or any other form of 
compensation that is tied to enrollment or 
financial aid. Beginning in 2002, the ban 
on incentive compensation was gradually 
weakened by the creation of twelve “safe 
harbor” exceptions to the rule. For-profit col-
leges were permitted, for example, to adjust 
the wages of recruiters twice a year, so long 
as the adjustment was not “based solely on 
the number of students recruited, admitted, 
enrolled, or awarded financial aid.”37 
A report issued in 2010 by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) revealed direct 
evidence of troubling recruiting practices at 
for-profit colleges.38 The GAO sent investiga-
tors posing as prospective students to fifteen 
proprietary colleges and recorded their 
encounters with admissions personnel at 
each college. The colleges were not a random 
sample of for-profits. Rather, the GAO chose 
a mix of privately owned and publicly traded 
schools of various sizes, all of which either 
received 89 percent or more (the legal limit 
is 90 percent) of their revenue from Title 
IV federal aid or were located in a state that 
was among the top ten recipients of Title IV 
funding.
According to the GAO investigators, officials 
at four of the fifteen schools encouraged 
applicants to engage in outright fraud, such 
as not reporting savings, in order to qualify 
for federal financial aid. Personnel at all 
fifteen colleges made “deceptive or other-
wise questionable” statements to undercover 
applicants. Examples included failing to 
provide information about the college’s costs 
and past graduation rates (federal regulations 
require them to report this information) and 
understating tuition by using the cost for 
nine months of attendance when the pro-
gram actually ran for twelve months. Some 
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contract before allowing them to speak with  
a financial adviser. 
Many for-profit colleges devote considerable 
resources to advertising, sales, and market-
ing. GAO investigators posing as prospective 
students entered their personal informa-
tion on websites designed to match students 
to colleges based on their stated interests. 
These investigators were contacted repeat-
edly, some within five minutes of signing 
up. One received more than 180 phone calls 
in one month from a for-profit recruiter. 
Advertisements for proprietary institutions 
can be seen regularly on television, in subway 
stations and trains, and on interstate highway 
billboards. According to one study, thirteen 
large publicly traded for-profit institutions 
spent around 11 percent of revenue in 2009 
on advertising. Altogether, about 24 percent 
of revenue was spent on sales and marketing 
(including advertising). The cost to recruit 
the average new student at a large national 
chain is around $4,000, or about 25 percent 
of average annual tuition.39 
The combination of for-profit institutions’ 
reliance on federal financial aid and use of 
incentive compensation in enrolling students 
creates incentives for overly aggressive stu-
dent recruitment. In the 2009–10 fiscal year, 
75 percent of revenues at for-profit institu-
tions came from Title IV funding.40 Federal 
regulation prevents for-profit colleges from 
relying on Title IV sources for more than  
90 percent of revenue, and many large chains 
such as University of Phoenix (86 percent) 
and Kaplan University (87 percent) are very 
close to the statutory limit. Publicly traded 
companies that rely heavily on federal finan-
cial aid also have a fiduciary duty to maxi-
mize value for their shareholders. Expanding 
enrollment to capture the federal student 
aid of marginal students unlikely to benefit 
economically from a program could prove to 
be a profitable strategy. When such institu-
tional incentives are combined with outreach 
to low-income, first-generation college stu-
dents who may be financially unsophisticated, 
the worry is that students may have overly 
optimistic views of the expected benefits and 
not fully understand the costs (for example, 
the difference between loans and grants) of 
the educational decisions they are making.
Career Orientation of For-Profit Colleges 
The career-oriented approach and wide range 
of specific occupational training offered by 
for-profit colleges attract many students. 
But this focus comes with some costs, espe-
cially for first-time postsecondary students. 
Learning about one’s own abilities and prefer-
ences to be able to make better-informed 
decisions about further education and career 
is a valuable part of initial college experiences. 
And such opportunities for exploration are 
more limited at for-profits. Part of the mission 
of a community college is to provide open 
access to a general liberal arts curriculum at a 
low cost so that students can learn whether a 
four-year degree is right for them. By not sad-
dling students with high debt burdens, com-
munity colleges preserve the “option value” of 
further postsecondary education.41 
Table 1 presents a transition matrix for 
students in the 2004–09 BPS categorized by 
initial program enrollment. Of all certificate 
seekers, 42 percent of those in community 
colleges and 53 percent of those in for-profits 
attained a certificate within six years. In addi-
tion, 41 percent of certificate seekers in com-
munity colleges, and 41 percent in for-profits, 
did not attain a certificate and were no longer 
enrolled at the end of six years. Community 
college students were more likely either to 
attain another degree or to still be enrolled  
(17 percent versus 6 percent).150    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN   
David Deming, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz
This pattern is even more pronounced 
among those beginning associate’s programs. 
Students in for-profits were more likely to 
attain an associate’s degree (28 percent 
versus 21 percent in community colleges), but 
they were also more likely to have left school 
without attaining any degree (53 percent 
versus 47 percent). Despite lower attain-
ment of the initially sought-after degree, 
community college students who began in 
associate’s programs were much more likely 
to consider it the first step of a longer edu-
cational journey. Fifteen percent of students 
in community colleges who initially enrolled 
in an associate’s degree program had either 
attained a bachelor’s degree or were enrolled 
in a four-year college at the end of six years. 
Lower tuition and the ability to attend school 
without borrowing large sums of money 
encourage such exploration.
In summing up the evidence on why students 
choose to go to for-profit schools, we reach 
the following conclusions. For-profit colleges 
offer a wide variety of programs and courses 
in fields that are in high demand among 
employers, such as health and information 
systems. But so do community colleges. 
Moreover, the two types of colleges do not 
seem to differ greatly in their ability to 
accommodate students with hectic schedules 
involving work and family demands. Both 
types of institutions offer courses at night, on 
weekends, and online.
The rise in for-profit enrollment coincided 
with the tightening of state higher education 
budgets and declining access to public insti-
tutions, especially community colleges. Their 
open-access mission means that few com-
munity colleges deny admission formally. But 
many students report that they are unable to 
register for required courses either because 
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the courses are full or because students must 
first complete (possibly needless) remedial 
coursework. These students may thus turn to 
for-profits as an alternative.
Some (perhaps many) students who choose to 
attend a for-profit institution may not arrive 
at that decision through a dispassionate and 
deliberate process of weighing costs and 
benefits. Even when costs and benefits are 
presented clearly and simply, education is an 
uncertain investment. The uncertainty is com-
pounded by the incentives of for-profit col-
leges to grow student enrollment and capture 
the associated federal student aid dollars, and 
by the evidence that proprietary institutions 
do not always present information on financial 
aid packages in a neutral manner.
The GAO investigative report on recruiting 
practices at for-profits raises concerns that 
fraudulent and deceptive behaviors have been 
widespread.42 If true, many students who 
enroll in for-profit institutions may base their 
enrollment decisions on distorted information 
concerning the cost and expected benefits (in 
terms of graduation rates and future employ-
ment prospects and earnings) of their edu-
cation. The GAO’s sampling method was in 
some ways designed to focus on schools with 
the strongest incentives to apply pressure in 
recruitment of new students. Yet the fact that 
official personnel at all fifteen schools made 
“deceptive or otherwise questionable state-
ments” to applicants suggests that these are 
unlikely to have been isolated incidents.
The highly focused career- and student-
centered approach of most for-profit  
colleges provides a possible benefit relative 
to community colleges. But the lack of flex-
ibility means that for-profit students forgo 
the option value of further education, and 
the expense of their programs means that 
students may not have the luxury of explor-
ing other educational and training opportu-
nities. The flexibility of community colleges 
as well as their lower tuition helps to explain 
why their students are more likely subse-
quently to enroll in a four-year college and 
to complete a bachelors’ degree. 
The failed partnership between California 
community colleges and Kaplan University 
illustrates that for-profits and community 
colleges often compete for the same stu-
dents. It also shows that part of the enroll-
ment growth at for-profit colleges is a 
consequence of declining access in the pub-
lic sector. Students turn to for-profits when 
community colleges are unable to meet their 
educational needs. 
The question of whether a prospective 
student has a choice between a for-profit and 
a public institution affects judgments about 
the relative costs and benefits of enrollment 
in for-profit institutions. In our earlier work, 
we compared outcomes of students among 
for-profits, community colleges, and four-
year public and nonprofit schools.43 Our find-
ing that students who attended for-profits 
have more debt and lower employment rates 
relative to students at the other institu-
tions is not relevant if students lack access 
to appropriate programs at public colleges. 
A related point is that for-profit spending 
on advertising and marketing may well be 
attracting many students who would other-
wise not have attended college at all. When 
community college is not a viable option, the 
relevant counterfactual to enrollment at a 
for-profit institution may be no postsecond-
ary education. 
For many people, a for-profit college educa-
tion endows them with skills that can be put 
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upon program completion. But the high cost 
of the education to the student and the mod-
est earning opportunities offered by many 
of the jobs for which these schools prepare 
students mean that caution is advised. Such 
caution applies to the students themselves, as 
well as to taxpayers who foot part of the bill 
through federal student aid and a much larger 
part when a student ends up not paying back 
federal student loans.
What Is the Social Value of  
For-Profit Education? 
Postsecondary education is financed by 
students and taxpayers. At public institutions, 
the tuition and fees paid by students are 
often a small fraction of the cost of provid-
ing education. State, federal, and (sometimes 
even) local governments pay most of the 
balance of the bill, often in complicated ways. 
Like federal Title IV aid, state appropriations 
for public institutions are tied to enrollment, 
albeit less directly.44 
These state subsidies help community 
colleges keep tuition sufficiently low that 
students have relatively small average federal 
loan allocations. Average tuition of first-
time undergraduates at community colleges 
in 2008 was only $1,153, compared with 
$10,168 at for-profit institutions.45 Only about 
13 percent of community college students 
borrowed money to attend school, compared 
with more than 90 percent of students in 
for-profits.46 Students at community colleges 
and some other public institutions rely less on 
Pell Grants and government loans precisely 
because the public has already subsidized 
their schooling.
According to a position paper issued in 2010 
by the Apollo Group, the corporation that 
owns and operates the University of Phoenix, 
for-profit colleges are a bargain for taxpayers 
because they cost the public “significantly 
less than traditional schools.”47 The report 
calculated the per-student taxpayer cost of 
a for-profit education as $4,519, compared 
with $11,340 for public two- and four-year 
institutions. The calculation included federal, 
state, and local government support, as well 
as the cost to taxpayers of loan defaults and 
taxes paid back on corporate profits.48
In a similar vein, Stephanie Cellini compared 
the costs to taxpayers and students of attend-
ing a community college as opposed to a two-
year for-profit institution.49 She estimated an 
annual per student cost to the taxpayer of 
$11,387 at a community college compared 
with $7,637 at a for-profit. In both analyses, 
community colleges were more costly for tax-
payers. But tuition and fees at for-profits cost 
the student, on average, nearly $20,000 more 
than they did at community colleges, mak-
ing the total cost of education about $15,000 
higher at a for-profit institution. 
Based on these figures, Cellini estimated 
the “break even” social and private rates 
of return on investment to be 9.8 percent 
and 8.5 percent, respectively, at for-profits, 
compared with 7.2 percent and 5.3 percent 
at community colleges. This calculation 
implies that, relative to community colleges, 
for-profits need to generate returns that are 
36 percent greater for society and 60 percent 
greater for individuals to be worth the cost. 
The relatively sparse literature on the subject 
has found results ranging from no significant 
difference in returns between the two sec-
tors to lower relative returns among students 
at for-profits, suggesting that the benefits to 
society of for-profits do not likely outweigh 
the costs.50 
Moreover, these comparisions of social 
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benefits of postsecondary institutions, such as 
research spillovers, the public use of facilities, 
and the civic benefits of liberal arts education. 
Studies of economic spillovers find substan-
tial benefits to localities from the presence 
of flagship public universities and university 
research more generally.51 The missions of 
public institutions (in particular, four-year col-
leges and universities) often explicitly include 
the provision of public goods and research 
and extension services for local industries, 
whereas for-profits (even those offering bach-
elors’ and higher degrees) explicitly tout that 
their faculty focus is only on teaching.52
Regulation of the For-Profit Sector
Federal regulations that govern for-profit 
colleges are intended to ensure that taxpayer 
money distributed to them is spent wisely. 
Thus, regulation should be designed to 
provide incentives to institutions to maximize 
the social value of the education they provide. 
The federal regulations affecting for-profits 
concern institutional eligibility for federal 
(mainly Title IV) student financial aid, stu-
dent outcomes for Title IV–eligible institu-
tions, and the delivery of federal financial aid 
to students. The 90/10 rule tries to ensure 
that for-profit institutions are no more than 
90 percent dependent on Title IV federal 
student aid as a share of their total revenues. 
Federally monitored student outcomes 
include default rates on federal student loans 
and, subject to ongoing judicial scrutiny, a 
broader range of student economic outcomes 
embodied in a new “gainful employment” 
regulation. Federal regulations also try to 
ensure transparency in the presentation 
of financial aid packages, limit the use of 
incentives for employees involved in student 
recruitment, and improve the availability of 
information on student graduation rates and 
economic outcomes. 
The 90/10 Rule
Federal student financial aid is the lifeblood 
of for-profit higher education in the United 
States. Federal grants and loans accounted  
for 73.7 percent of the revenues of Title IV–
eligible for-profit higher education institutions 
in 2008–09.53 And these figures understate 
the importance of federal student aid because 
they do not include military educational 
benefits.54 For-profit schools can acquire no 
more than 90 percent of their revenue from 
Title IV sources to maintain their eligibility 
for that aid, and the constraint comes close 
to binding for many for-profits, especially 
some of the large chains. The availability of 
federal student aid may contribute directly to 
increases in tuition prices, a conjecture known 
as the “Bennett hypothesis.” A recent study 
by Stephanie Cellini and Claudia Goldin 
found that tuition for certificate programs in 
Title IV–eligible for-profits was 75 percent 
higher than in comparable institutions where 
students cannot apply for federal financial 
aid.55 Related work by Cellini found that 
increases in the generosity of Pell Grants and 
other forms of student aid led to increased 
market entry by for-profit institutions.56
Cohort default rates
Federal regulations concerning the eligibil-
ity of institutions for Title IV financial aid 
also try to ensure that postsecondary pro-
grams provide marketable skills and do not 
overburden students with financial debt. To 
this end, the U.S. Department of Education 
monitors the default rates of entering cohorts 
of students by institution. The cohort default 
rate is defined as the share of borrowers at 
each school who enter into repayment on 
federal loans during a twelve-month period 
and subsequently default in the next two (or 
three) years. Institutions with a two-year 
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in one year, or 25 percent for three consecu-
tive years, lose their eligibility for Title IV 
aid for one to three years.57 The sanctioning 
of schools with high default rates applies to 
all institutions that accept Title IV money, 
including for-profits, community colleges, and 
four-year universities of all types.
Implemented beginning in the late 1980s, 
cohort default rate regulation led to the 
closing of many trade schools in the early 
1990s when they were unable to retain Title 
IV eligibility. The official cohort default rate 
for all types of institutions fell from a high 
of 22.4 percent in 1990 to 11.6 percent in 
1993 and continued downward to a low of 
4.5 percent in 2003, with some of the decline 
probably attributable to a strengthening 
economy over the same period.58 There were 
concerns, however, that the low two-year 
default rate masked high rates of default in 
the third and subsequent years, as well as a 
rapid rise in loan deferments and forbear-
ances.59 To address the perceived inadequacy 
of the cohort default rate definition, the 
Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 
expanded the default rate window to three 
years starting with the 2012 cohort.60 
The Department of Education released trial 
three-year cohort default rates by institu-
tion for the years 2005 to 2008 (covering 
defaults from 2008 to 2011) to estimate the 
impact of the new regulation. For the 2008 
cohort, lengthening the window from two to 
three years nearly doubled the default rate 
(from 7.0 to 13.8 percent), and the increase 
was particularly striking among for-profit 
colleges (11.6 to 25.0 percent). If the new 
regulations had been applied to the 2005–08 
period, the number of schools facing a loss of 
Title IV eligibility would have increased more 
than tenfold (from 23 to 270). Furthermore, 
the share of sanctioned schools classified as 
proprietary institutions would have increased 
from 48 percent to 80 percent.61
The cohort default rate is primarily a mea-
sure of the cost of Title IV loans to taxpayers. 
Cellini estimated that loan defaults accounted 
for 36 percent of the total cost of for-profit 
education to taxpayers.62 Loan defaults are 
also an indirect indicator of student outcomes 
after graduation. It is difficult to repay a loan 
when you are unemployed. Still, students 
could struggle under the weight of loan 
repayments without ever formally defaulting. 
More generally, the cohort default rate does 
not explicitly link the costs of postsecond-
ary enrollment to the benefits. For example, 
a community college could have low loan 
default rates because of low tuition but also 
might place very few students in good jobs. 
The limitations of the cohort default rate 
measure as well as the problems in recruit-
ment activities by for-profits documented by 
GAO helped motivate the more encompassing 
gainful employment regulations.
Gainful Employment
Unlike the cohort default rate regula-
tion, the gainful employment regulation 
recently adopted by the U.S. Department of 
Education (formally known as the Gainful 
Employment-Debt Measures) is targeted 
specifically at for-profit postsecondary institu-
tions.63 Under the regulation, a program is 
considered to lead to gainful employment if 
at least 35 percent of the students in each 
cohort are in repayment of their federal loans 
or if the annual loan payment for a typi-
cal student is 12 percent or less of annual 
earnings or 30 percent or less of discretion-
ary income.64 A program that fails all three 
measures for three of four fiscal years would 
lose Title IV eligibility, which means students 
in the program would no longer be eligible 
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regulation applies to all programs at for-profit 
institutions but only to certificate programs at 
public and nonprofit institutions.
According to the Higher Education Act 
of 1965, federal Title IV aid can be used 
either by students in accredited bachelor’s or 
associates degree programs, or at “any school 
that provides not less than a 1-year program 
of training to prepare students for gainful 
employment in a recognized occupation.” 
This statutory language provides a justifica-
tion for the department’s focus on particular 
institutions and programs and on outcome-
based measures of success in the gainful 
employment regulation.
The regulation is an important departure 
from the existing regulatory framework in 
at least two ways. First, it targets individual 
programs within institutions. The Education 
Department’s concern with the existing regu-
latory framework was that the cohort default 
rate, by averaging across programs within 
institutions, did not provide students with a 
good measure of the likely career prospects 
of individual programs. The second, and 
more significant, departure is its explicit link 
between the costs (both to students and tax-
payers) and the benefits of higher education, 
at least as they are reflected in earnings. The 
regulation also tries to make available more 
transparent information on student program 
completion rates and economic outcomes to 
prospective students. 
The future of the gainful employment 
regulation is uncertain. At the time of this 
writing, a federal district court hearing a 
lawsuit by the Association of Private Sector 
Colleges and Universities had ruled that the 
Department of Education failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to justify the loan repay-
ment standard. The judge held that while 
the debt-to-income standards were based on 
objective criteria and research, the justifica-
tion for a 35 percent repayment rate was 
based only on the fact that this rate identifies 
the bottom quarter of schools.65 Because the 
debt-to-income and repayment standards are 
designed to work together, the court decided 
that they could not be separated and thus 
vacated the entire ruling. As of mid-July 
2012, department officials had released only 
a brief statement that they were “reviewing 
our legal and policy options.”66
The ruling came just a few days after the 
department released its first round of 
trial data collection related to the gainful 
employment regulation. According to data 
For the 2008 cohort, 
lengthening the window from 
two to three years nearly 
doubled the default rate 
(from 7.0 to 13.8 percent), 
and the increase was 
particularly striking among 
for-profit colleges (11.6 to 
25.0 percent). If the new 
regulations had been applied 
to the 2005–08 period, the 
number of schools facing 
a loss of Title IV eligibility 
would have increased more 
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from students enrolled in 2011, 193 pro-
grams at ninety-three different postsecond-
ary institutions—1.4 percent of all programs 
and 5.2 percent of programs with more than 
thirty graduates—would have failed to meet 
all three standards.67 Table 2 shows the 
share of programs by type of institution that 
would have failed each gainful employment 
standard. In accordance with the regula-
tions, all programs at for-profit institutions, 
but only certificate programs at public and 
nonprofit institutions, are included in the 
tabulations in table 2.
Had the court upheld only the two debt-
to-income standards, the failure rate would 
rise from 1.4 percent to 2.6 percent overall 
and from 5.2 percent to 9.6 percent among 
larger programs. Of the three standards, 
the annual earnings standard is by far the 
easiest to meet. Only 2.7 percent of all 
programs and 10 percent of larger programs 
have graduates with an average annual loan 
payment exceeding 12 percent of annual 
earnings. In contrast, the failure rates for 
the other two standards are much higher. 
Among programs with more than thirty 
Table 2.  Share of Programs that Fail Gainful Employment Standards
Percentage except where indicated
table 2_dem_Share of Programs_danF 3ai
Category Overall Public or
nonprofit
For-profit,
chain
For-profit,
independent
All programs         
Failed all three standards   1.4  0.0  1.0  4.2
Failed annual earnings  2.7  0.0  3.2 6.5
Failed discretionary earnings  14.4  0.7  21.2 29.1
Failed repayment rate  10.9  1.0  12.3 25.7
Programs with more than thirty graduates   
Failed all three standards  5.2  0.0  3.1 7.9
Failed annual earnings  10.0  0.5  9.4 12.4
Failed discretionary earnings  53.8  11.0  62.1 55.5
Failed repayment rate  40.5  15.9  36.2 48.9
Source: U.S. Department of Education Federal Student Aid Data Center. 
Note: These data report the performance of the institutions’ 2011 graduates on the three gainful employment standards and are published for 
informational purposes only since the regulation does not apply to this cohort of students. The annual earnings standard requires the average 
annual loan payment for a cohort of students from a program not exceed 12 percent of annual earnings. The discretionary earnings standard 
analogously requires that the average annual loan payment not exceed 30 percent of discretionary earnings. The repayment rate standard 
requires that at least 35 percent of students are in repayment of their federal loans. All programs at for-profit institutions, but only certificate 
programs at public and private non-profit institutions are covered by the gainful employment regulation and included in the tabulations. The top 
panel includes all programs (including those with thirty or fewer students) in the tabulations and shows the share of all eligible programs that would 
fail each standard under the assumption that no programs with thirty or fewer graduates are counted as failing. The bottom panel shows failure 
rates only among programs that have more than thirty graduates. The department did not report data on at least one of the three measures for 
nearly 75 percent of programs because it restricts calculations to programs with more than thirty students in the relevant cohorts. The programs 
with missing data are small and not representative of the experience of the average student. Because enrollment data was not reported for 
individual programs, we could not weight the calculations by enrollment. 
Number of programs  13,772  5,893  4,380 3,499 
Number of programs  3,696  364 1,495 1,837
Source: U.S. Department of Education Federal Student Aid Data Center.  
 
Note: These data report the performance of the institutions’ 2011 graduates on the three gainful employment standards and 
are published for informational purposes only since the regulation does not apply to this cohort of students. The annual earnings 
standard requires the average annual loan payment for a cohort of students from a program not exceed 12 percent of annual 
earnings. The discretionary earnings standard analogously requires that the average annual loan payment not exceed 30 percent of 
discretionary earnings. The repayment rate standard requires that at least 35 percent of students are in repayment of their federal 
loans. All programs at for-profit institutions, but only certificate programs at public and private nonprofit institutions, are covered by 
the gainful employment regulation and included in the tabulations. The top panel includes all programs (including those with thirty 
or fewer students) in the tabulations and shows the share of all eligible programs that would fail each standard under the assump-
tion that no programs with thirty or fewer graduates are counted as failing. The bottom panel shows failure rates only among pro-
grams that have more than thirty graduates. The department did not report data on at least one of the three measures for nearly 
75 percent of programs because it restricts calculations to programs with more than thirty students in the relevant cohorts. The 
programs with missing data are small and not representative of the experience of the average student. Because enrollment data 
was not reported for individual programs, we could not weight the calculations by enrollment. 
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graduates, 53.8 percent would fail the dis-
cretionary income standard and 40.5 percent 
would fail the loan repayment standard. Of 
programs that fail the annual income stan-
dard, 95 percent also fail the discretionary 
earnings standard. Thus a regulation based 
only on the annual earnings standard would 
be far simpler to administer but would have 
an impact similar to the currently contested 
gainful employment standard. 
The for-profit chains have the highest failure 
rate for the gainful employment trial stan-
dards. We define a chain as having campus 
branches in at least two census divisions or as 
operating primarily online.68 Nearly 8 percent 
of programs in chains with thirty or more 
graduates would have failed to meet the stan-
dards, compared with about 3 percent among 
independent for-profit institutions. The big-
gest difference comes in the loan repayment 
rate standard: 49 percent of larger for-profit 
chains would have failed compared with 
36 percent of independents. Higher rates 
of failure for chain for-profits hold equally 
within major categories of programs such as 
health professions, business, and information 
technology.69 Programs with particularly high 
rates of failure include graphic design and 
visual arts and law enforcement and security.
The experience of the new cohort default rate 
regulation in the early 1990s suggests that, 
if and when the gainful employment regula-
tions go into effect, they will result in some of 
the worst offenders being shut down, but the 
remaining for-profit institutions are likely to 
adjust quickly to the regulations. Recent evi-
dence from the financial disclosures of pub-
licly traded for-profits suggests that the sector 
may already have been affected by public 
scrutiny. After growth of 15 to 25 percent 
from 2007 to June 2010 (around the time that 
the GAO report and the gainful employment 
proposed rule were released), enrollment in 
thirteen large for-profits began to shrink in 
late 2010. By March 2011, new enrollments 
were down by 18 percent.70 In its 2011 annual 
report, the University of Phoenix reported 
that enrollment among new degree-seekers 
was down by more than 40 percent. 
If it stands, the gainful employment regula-
tion is likely to accelerate the increasing 
movement of for-profit institutions, particu-
larly large national chains and online institu-
tions, into offering bachelor’s and advanced 
degree programs that cater to students better 
able to repay federal student loans. Because 
longer programs entail more Title IV aid, 
for-profits already had a strong incentive to 
develop these programs. For-profits have 
more than quadrupled their share of bach-
elor’s degrees granted, from 1.6 percent in 
1999–2000 to 6.7 percent in 2010–11.71 An 
analysis by J. P. Morgan that considers the 
impact of the gainful employment regula-
tion on the sector repeatedly mentions “high 
exposure to bachelor’s degrees” as a positive 
factor for the stock price of publicly traded 
for-profits.72 
Looking Ahead
We draw three main conclusions from our 
overview of the for-profit sector and its role 
in educating disadvantaged students. First, 
although community colleges may provide 
an equal or better education at lower cost, 
demand for higher education is likely to 
outpace state funding in the near term, and 
many students who attend for-profits are not 
academically strong enough to attend a selec-
tive institution. Thus the relevant compari-
son of costs and benefits for individuals who 
attend a for-profit institution will often be no 
postsecondary credential at all. In this sense 
the gainful employment regulation, which 
attempts to estimate whether a program 158    THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN   
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provides good value to students who enroll, 
seems appropriate in principle.
Second, for-profit colleges seem to be at their 
best with short, well-defined programs that 
offer a clear path toward a particular occupa-
tion. Such programs are also potentially eas-
ier to regulate because their objective is clear. 
Expanding the reach of the gainful employ-
ment standard to apply, for example, to recipi-
ents of an associate’s degree in liberal arts at 
public community colleges would be more 
difficult to justify because personal explora-
tion and the option value of future education 
are essential features of the program. In that 
case, low costs and low measurable benefits 
in terms of postgraduate earnings make more 
sense. In contrast, the student who graduates 
from a high-tuition for-profit college with 
substantial debt and who does not find steady 
employment at a reasonable wage will quickly 
encounter financial difficulties, and there is 
less of a case that such an education has the 
broad social benefits of liberal arts programs.
Finally, the relatively poor performance 
in terms of completion rates, default rates, 
and labor market outcomes of those attend-
ing for-profits among seekers of bachelor’s 
degrees is troubling because the sector 
seems to be heading in that direction. Large 
national chain for-profits have a relatively 
greater share of their enrollment in bach-
elor’s degree programs than other for-profits, 
and among all for-profits, the rate of growth 
in enrollments and degrees awarded in bach-
elor’s and advanced degree programs has 
been much greater than that for associate’s 
degree and certificate programs. Because 
tuition in bachelor’s degree programs is 
higher and students enroll for more years, 
the federal government’s per-student com-
mitment of taxpayer money is several times 
greater than for a one-year certificate pro-
gram. In principle, greater taxpayer commit-
ment should be accompanied by increased 
scrutiny concerning whether students 
complete the program and make sufficiently 
high earnings to justify the investment and 
pay back their student loans. Yet much of the 
education production process in bachelor’s 
degree programs is a black box, even for 
(perhaps especially for) more selective four-
year institutions. The set of skills one gains 
with a bachelor’s are varied, as are the set of 
potential occupations in which one can be 
employed. The variety of goals and outcomes 
presents a challenge for regulation. 
When students vary greatly in their goals 
and projected benefits of education, a “one 
size fits all” regulation for a degree program 
becomes difficult to manage. One possible 
solution is to strengthen disclosure require-
ments.73 If potential students could view 
costs and expected benefits of a program in a 
simple and standardized format, they could 
make better decisions, and the government 
would not have to impose a uniform standard 
of value. Even better, requiring counseling 
by an independent third party to make sure 
prospective students understand financial aid 
packages and student loan obligations could 
mitigate the incentives faced by many recruit-
ers at for-profits. 
The for-profit sector plays, and is likely to 
continue to play, an important role in U.S. 
higher education in an era of public-sector fis-
cal constraints. A key challenge in regulating 
for-profit colleges is to restrain overly aggres-
sive and potentially misleading recruitment 
practices while not stifling educational inno-
vation and improved postsecondary learning 
opportunities for disadvantaged students.VOL. 23 / NO. 1 / SPRING 2013   159
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